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Abstract:  This paper develops a general equilibrium monetary model with performance 
incentives to study the inflation-unemployment relationship.  A long-run downward-
sloping Phillips curve can exist with perfectly anticipated inflation because workers’ 
incentive to exert effort depend on financial market returns.  Consequently, higher 
inflation rates can reduce wages and stimulate employment.  An upward-sloping or 
vertical Phillips Curve can arise instead, depending on agents’ risk aversion and the 
possibility of capital formation.  Welfare might be higher away from the Friedman rule 
and with a central bank putting some weight on employment. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Some central banks (e.g., the U.S. Federal Reserve System) explicitly have a dual 
mandate that requires balancing price stability and economic growth.  Others (e.g., the Bank of 
Canada) have only an explicit inflation target.  No central bank, however, can ignore 
macroeconomic stability.  As Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke (2007) has 
explained,  
 
In fact, the practice of monetary policy in an inflation-targeting regime is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a dual mandate such as that given to the Federal 
Reserve; indeed, most if not all inflation-targeting central banks today practice 
“flexible”inflation targeting, meaning that they take account of other economic 
goals besides price stability—notably economic growth, employment, and 
financial stability—when making policy decisions.   
 
Little is known, however, about how monetary policy affects unemployment or is 
constrained by a concern about unemployment.  Mishkin (2007a) surveys the many channels or 
transmission mechanisms that have been proposed to explain the effect of monetary policy on the 
real economy.  None of these channels works through wage or employment determination 
directly.  Most operate through interest rates, exchange rates, or stock prices, which directly 
affect some component of output, and employment is determined implicitly, as firms adjust 
output.  Some channels instead work through credit markets, affecting the supply of credit 
directly or the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in credit markets.   
Omission of the microfoundations of employment and wage determination from 
transmission mechanisms is significant.  Levin et al. (2005) finds that the optimal monetary 
policy is extremely sensitive to the wage-contracting mechanism.  Similarly, Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) finds that the optimal policy design depends on the interaction between frictions and 
shocks.  All of these authors call for more research into the microfoundations linking wage 
determination and the nonneutrality of money.   
This article fills the gap in the existing literature by presenting a general-equilibrium 
monetary model in which the impact of monetary policy is transmitted to real variables through 
the wage-contracting/employment process in the labor market.  The model gives rise to either a 
downward-sloping, vertical, or upward-sloping long-run Phillips curve.  The model is used to 
address three questions:  First, how does monetary policy affect labor-market contracts and thus 
employment?  Second, what is the optimal monetary policy in the face of involuntary 
1 unemployment?  Third, what weight should a central bank with a dual mandate put on each 
mandate?   
The model used is a variant of the overlapping generations model with random-relocation 
(e.g., Schreft and Smith, 1997, 1998).  Monetary policy has real effects because the model’s risk-
averse agents face two types of risk—liquidity risk (modeled as relocation shocks) and income 
risk (modeled as uncertainty about whether agents will find employment)—and because frictions 
exist in both labor and financial markets.  Private information about an agent’s effort on the job 
results in firms setting efficiency wages and hiring only a subset of available workers, leaving 
the rest involuntarily unemployed.  Spatial separation, limited communication, and restrictions 
on asset portability prevent private credit markets from operating and, along with the risk of 
relocation, create a role for banks to provide insurance against liquidity shocks.  These financial-
market frictions are present in the standard random-relocation model, but here they interact with 
the parameters governing the frictions in the labor market and agents’ opportunity cost of being 
employed.  Agents can self-insure against income risk by exerting effort on the job, and asset 
returns affect agents’ desire to do so.  For example, if workers earn high returns from their 
savings, they have less incentive to insure themselves against the risk of unemployment by 
exerting labor effort.
1  The Phillips curve is the set of inflation rate-unemployment rate pairs that 
are steady states.  The slope of the Phillips curve and the optimal monetary policy (modeled as a 
choice of an inflation target) depend on fundamentals of labor and financial markets, on agents’ 
risk aversion, and on whether capital formation is possible. 
Section 2 follows the New Keynesian models of the Phillips curve in presenting a version 
of the model that abstracts from capital formation.  The model has three general features.  First, 
varying any of the parameters that characterize the labor-market or financial-market frictions or 
affect their impact on unemployment, holding the others fixed, generates a family of long-run 
Phillips curves.
2  At a higher steady-state inflation rate, agents know that the return on their 
                                                 
1  In contrast, in Reed and Waller (2006), agents have random endowments, which is an alternative form of income 
risk, and information frictions prevent them from contractually sharing that risk.  Fiat currency, the only asset in the 
model, is shown to allow agents to self-insure against income risk.    
2  There are different possible interpretations of the time period to which the long-run Phillips curves in the model 
pertain.  One interpretation relies on the fact that in a steady state, the economy’s growth rate equals its potential 
growth rate.  This translates to a period of about three years, as reflected by the Federal Open Market Committee’s 
November 2007 decision to release its members’ projections over a three-year horizon (Bernanke 2007).  A second 
interpretation takes a period in the model to be about 20 years long, and the Phillips curves pertain to periods of 
similar length.  A third interpretation is that the model captures the part of the human life cycle that occurs shortly 
before and after retirement.  Under this interpretation, a period in model is five to 10 years, and that is the period to 
2 assets will be lower; hence, they have greater incentive to put forth full effort on the job.  Firms, 
in turn, can offer lower wages and still induce full effort, so the equilibrium unemployment rate 
is lower.  Second, points along each Phillips curve can be ranked based on welfare, which is 
taken to be the expected utility of a representative agent.  Third, the optimal monetary policy, 
defined as the inflation target that maximizes welfare, can be identified.   
The model of Section 2 yields striking results.  If agents are relatively risk averse 
(meaning more risk averse than with logarithmic utility), the long-run Phillips curves are always 
downward sloping.
3  The inflation target that maximizes welfare can vary dramatically across 
Phillips curves within a given family, being the target that achieves either full employment or the 
Friedman rule (the rate that drives the gross nominal interest rate to one), or some inflation rate 
in between.  For a central bank with a dual mandate that requires balancing an inflation goal 
against an unemployment goal, the weight that should be given to each goal depends on the 
parameters for the frictions, the opportunity cost of employment, and the disutility of labor.  
Equal weight on each goal is not in general optimal.  For example, if the disutility of labor is 
sufficiently high, the Friedman rule is always optimal.   
If instead agents are less risk averse (meaning that they have log preferences), the Phillips 
curves are vertical at a natural rate of unemployment that depends only on real variables and the 
labor-market frictions but is independent of financial-market frictions.  The Friedman rule is 
always optimal, in contrast to the case where agents are relatively risk averse.  As a result, a 
central bank should put weight only on its inflation objective.   
Comparing the optimal inflation target across Phillips curves in the Section 2 economy 
shows that, regardless of agents’ risk aversion, agents are better off when the frictions are low or 
when agents have good alternatives to employment (that is, the opportunity cost of employment 
is high).  A central bank, however, cannot control those factors.   
Section 3 presents a variant of the model that allows for capital formation.  If agents are 
relatively risk averse, the additional complexity of the model makes closed-form solutions 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the Phillips curves apply.  Whatever the interpretation chosen, the Phillips curves in the economy of Section 
2, which can be though of as having a fixed capital stock, should pertain to a shorter period of time than the curves 
in the Section 3 economy, with capital formation.  In addition, monetary policy should have effects in the short run 
as well as the long run in this model. 
3  This finding is consistent with Fair (2000), Akerlof et al. (2000), and King and Watson (1994).  The latter also 
shows that the Phillips curve’s elasticity adjusts to changing economic circumstances, while Akerlof et al. finds that 
the tradeoff is strongest at lower inflation rates and disappears at sufficiently high inflation rates.  DiNardo and 
Moore find a long-run tradeoff for nine OECD countries. 
3 unobtainable.  Numerical analysis indicates, however, that the long-run Phillips curves are 
upward sloping.
4  The welfare-maximizing inflation target is the lowest inflation rate achievable 
and for which an equilibrium exists, which means that a central bank with a dual mandate should 
put all its emphasis on its inflation goal.  This inflation rate might be the one that achieves the 
Friedman rule, but it might not be.  Along some Phillips curves, there is no steady-state 
equilibrium under the Friedman rule.  Intermediate values of the parameters governing the 
frictions and the opportunity cost of employment are optimal as well because if those parameters 
are too low, then no steady-state equilibrium exists, and if they are too high, then the steady-state 
inflation rate is associated with a higher steady-state unemployment rate than the ones achievable 
if those parameters were lower.  Alternatively, if agents have log preferences (i.e., are not too 
risk averse), then as in the model without capital formation, the Phillips curve is vertical at the 
natural rate of unemployment, and the Friedman rule is always optimal.  However, with capital 
formation, the natural rate of unemployment depends on financial-market frictions as well as 
labor-market frictions.   
In addition to these results, several lessons stand out from Sections 2 and 3.  The first is 
that monetary policy influences the performance incentives (e.g., the wage rate, incentive pay) 
that firms offer through policy’s effect on worker’s financial-market returns and thus their 
incentive to exert full effort on the job.  This is explicit in the model and not surprising.  The 
decline in equity prices after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States drove 
some retired workers back into the labor market and caused others to postpone retirement.  That 
type of impact on worker incentives reduces the wages firms must offer to induce work effort.  
A second and related lesson is that monetary policy can have real effects even in the long 
run without any nominal rigidities or unanticipated inflation.  This is consistent with some 
research indicating that most U.S. firms adjust prices fairly frequently, suggesting few nominal 
rigidities, at least for prices.
5  In addition, theoretical research suggests that with perfect 
foresight, there would be no inflation-unemployment trade-off; the Phillips curve would be 
vertical.
6  
A third lesson from the model is that parameters characterizing fundamental features of 
                                                 
4  This is consistent with Friedman (1977), which finds evidence in cross-country data supporting an upward-sloping 
Phillips curve. 
5  Bils and Klenow (2004) find that half of prices are changed every 5.5 months or less.  Dennis (2006) finds that 
about 60 percent of firms change prices each quarter, although most also use a rule-of-thumb in setting prices. 
6  See Lucas (1972) and Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
4 labor and financial markets are critical to an economy’s inflation-unemployment relationship, 
altering the position and slope of the long-run Phillips curves.
7  These same parameters, along 
with the disutility of labor effort, are critical to determining the welfare-maximizing inflation 
target.  The implication is that the impact of a central bank’s choice of a particular inflation 
target on employment is dependent on such parameters.  Because these parameters are difficult 
to estimate, a central bank is challenged in choosing its inflation target, regardless of the 
formality with which such a target is specified.  In particular, the Friedman rule is not necessarily 
optimal.
8  In some cases a low and positive inflation rate is optimal, and in other cases an even 
higher inflation rate is optimal.
9   
Fourth, the analysis when agents are not too risk averse (i.e., have log preferences) 
highlights features of vertical Phillips curves.  First, the position of a Phillips curve that is 
vertical at the natural rate of unemployment depends on labor-market and financial-market 
fundamentals.  Consequently, when parameters characterizing these frictions and fundamentals 
shift, the vertical Phillips curve also shifts.  This is consistent with empirical evidence on the 
volatility of the natural rate of unemployment.
10  Second, the possibility of capital formation 
enhances the impact of financial-market frictions on the natural rate of unemployment.   
A final striking lesson from the model is the pervasiveness of the effect that 
unemployment has on the economy.  The model teaches that when the possibility of involuntary 
unemployment is added to a random-relocation model, aggregate income and aggregate deposits 
depend on the level of employment.  The lower the unemployment rate, the more deposits banks 
have available to invest in the economy’s assets.  Therefore, the employment and unemployment 
rates, the wage rate, and the opportunity cost of employment, which jointly determine the 
volume of deposits, enter into banks’ asset demand functions.  In contrast, when capital is added 
to a simple random-relocation model, abstracting from any employment decisions, banks have an 
                                                 
7   Similarly, although in a model abstracting from unemployment, Davig (2007) finds that changing costs of price 
adjustment change the slope of the Phillips curve, with lower costs making the curve steeper.   
8  Mishkin (2007b) summarizes the reasons why models have found that a zero or negative inflation rate is not 
optimal.   
9 These findings are consistent with existing research.  Billi (2007) finds the optimal inflation rate to be positive but 
robustly below 1 percent.  Akerlof et al. (1996) and Andersen (2002), for example, find that a positive and low 
inflation rate, something around 2 percent or 3 percent, is optimal.  Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) finds that in an 
economy with structural imperfections, such as the existence of an underground economy, the optimal inflation rate 
is between 0 percent and 22 percent.   
10   King and Morley (2007) finds that in post-war U.S. data, that the natural rate of unemployment, measured as the 
time-varying steady state of a structural vector autoregression, is quite volatile, and its movements can be related to 
variables associated with labor-market search, labor productivity, real wages, and sectoral shifts in the labor market.   
5 additional asset (capital) in which they can invest and thus an additional first-order condition, but 
their demand functions for other assets are no more complex.
11  
This article is not the first to attempt to incorporate labor-market fundamentals into a 
model of the Phillips curve so that the inflation-unemployment relationship can be analyzed 
directly.  Others who have attempted this include Blanchard and Gali (2007), Ravenna and 
Walsh (2007), Rocheteau, Rupert, and Wright (2006), and Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran 
(2004).  The first two rely on sticky prices, distinguishing them from the latter two and from this 
article.
12  The latter two, however, do not model performance incentives in the labor market and 
reach different, or no, conclusions about the optimal monetary policy.  Rocheteau, Rupert, and 
Wright (2006) embeds indivisible labor and Rogerson (1988) employment lotteries into a Lagos-
Wright (2005) model with the usual frictions to generate a monetary equilibrium and with 
preference shocks instead of random matching.  The result is an equilibrium long-run Phillips 
curve that can be downward or upward sloping or vertical.  The authors assume that buyers and 
sellers have the same bargaining power and find that the Friedman rule is always optimal, in 
contrast to this article.  Andolfatto et al. (2004) develops a model with information frictions in 
financial markets (agents must make asset choices before monetary policy is known) and with 
search frictions in labor markets that generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve in the short 
run and an upward-sloping curve in the long run.  The relationship arises from a monetary 
transmission mechanism that is most similar to the one in this article:  an unanticipated monetary 
policy action affects interest rates, which affect firm liquidity and recruiting activity, and thereby 
employment.  In addition, the change in interest rates alters workers’ desired deposits, which 
affects liquidity further, although at the next date, leading to a second round of employment 
effects.  Banks do not arise endogenously in Andolfatto et al., however, and optimal monetary 
policy is not analyzed, which distinguishes it from this article.  
                                                 
11  Schreft and Smith (1997) model the latter.  Agents are endowed with one unit of time that they supply 
inelastically to production. 
12  Blanchard and Gali (2007), for example, combine real wage rigidities in the labor market with Calvo staggered 
price setting in the goods market.  Ravenna and Walsh (2007) model an economy with a wholesale and retail sector 
to generate a downward-sloping Phillips curve.  Agents can gain employment with wholesale firms via a matching 
technology and face some exogenous probability of separation from those firms.  Retail firms only sell goods 
produced by wholesalers, which requires no labor input, and are Calvo price-setters.  Parameters characterizing 
workers’ bargaining power and labor-market tightness affect the coefficients in the Phillips curve.  The inclusion of 
sticky prices in Blanchard and Gali and Ravenna and Walsh models is interesting because Nason and Slotsve (2004) 
finds that a model with labor-market search and flexible prices matches actual price level movements in the data 
better than a sticky price model does. 
6  
2.  A Model of the Phillips Curve 
  This section presents a two-asset overlapping generations model in which the presence of 
moral hazard and use of performance incentives in the labor market results in monetary policy 
having real effects and generates either a downward-sloping or vertical long-run Phillips curve, 
depending on agents’ risk aversion, which affects the elasticity of the demand for money.  The 
model follows the precedent set by most New Keynesian models of the Phillips curve in 
abstracting from capital formation.   
 
2.1  The Environment   
The economy exists at discrete dates t = 1, 2, … and consists of two separate geographic 
locations.  Each location is populated by an infinite sequence of identical two-period-lived 
generations.  Each new generation of young agents is of unit mass.  Each location also has two 
sectors, known as the primary and secondary sectors, each with its own labor market, following 
Bulow and Summers (1986). 
Agents born at   are each endowed with one unit of labor time when young, which 
they supply to the primary labor market unless they are unemployed.  If they obtain employment 
in the primary labor market, they either exert full effort or shirk, exerting no effort.  Their effort 
on the job, represented by 
1 t ≥
{ } 0,1 t e ∈ , is private information as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and 
is the source of one friction in the economy.  An agent’s disutility from formal employment is 
given by  , where v is assumed to be identical for all young agents and known to firms.  
Those young agents who are unemployed, having failed to obtain a job in the primary labor 
market, “work” in the secondary labor market, which can be thought of as home production.
0 v >
13  
Effort exerted in home production is costless.   
Agents when old derive utility from consumption of the economy’s single consumption 
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 (1) 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, the secondary sector can be thought of as the minimum-wage sector, and unemployment can be 
interpreted as the lack of employment in the primary sector. 
7 where   denotes the agent’s consumption.  In particular, utility from consumption is:  1 t c +

























⎪ ⎪ = ⎩⎭
 (2) 
Attention is restricted to values of  1 θ ≥ , consistent with Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998) and 
empirical estimates of individuals’ degree of risk aversion, which are typically around two.
14  
  At the end of each period, a randomly selected fraction,  ( ) 0,1 π ∈ , of young individuals 
learns that they will be forced to relocate to the other island at the beginning of the next period.  
The probability of relocation, π , is exogenous, publicly known, the same across both islands, 
and independent of a worker’s employment status.  
 
2.1.1  Employment and the Labor Market 
  In the primary labor market, firms have monitoring technologies that sometimes allow 
them to detect shirking behavior.
15  The conditional probability of a worker being caught 
shirking is q.  Workers caught shirking are fired, while those not caught receive the real wage   
from the firm.  Unemployed workers supply their labor time to home production, for which they 
receive a “wage” of 
t w
τ .  Without loss of generality, τ  is time invariant.  It is also assumed to be 
positive and finite, which is necessary for wages in the primary market to be positive and finite, 
as will be apparent below.  All unemployment is involuntary in that agents are ex ante identical, 
but only a fraction of them is employed in the primary sector and earns the higher wage rate  .  
See Bulow and Summers (1986).   
w
  In standard efficiency-wage models, a worker’s effort is determined by (i) the severity of 
the information friction (i.e., the inefficiency of monitoring) and (ii) the disutility of labor effort.  
Here, in contrast, the financial returns from working also play a role.  For firms to maximize 
profits, the wage rate must be set to induce workers to exert full effort.  This occurs when the 
                                                 
14 For example, using Italian data, Chiappori and Paiella (2006) compute a median estimate equal to 1.7.  From the 
consumer expenditures survey, Mazzocco (2006) obtains similar findings.   
15  In subsequent sections, where environments with capital are considered, primary sector firms operate constant-
returns-to-scale technologies and earn zero profit.  However, in this section, where labor is the only explicit factor of 
production, firms can earn positive profits.  To keep the model tractable, firms in this section are taken to be a 
second type of agent, each with a linear utility function, that consumes any profits earned.  These agents will be 
ignored in the welfare analysis to follow; however, as will be shown, profits are higher when the expected utility of 
the two-period lived agents is higher, so monetary policies that maximize the latter’s expected utility also would 
make these firms better off. 
8 utility from working and exerting full effort is at least as great as the expected utility from 




   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
dd
tt tt t UR w v q UR w q UR .
d τ −≥ − +  (3) 
This expression reduces to 
   ( ) ( )
dd
tt t qURw UR v τ ⎡⎤ − = ⎣⎦  (4) 
because profit maximization requires that (3) be satisfied with equality.  The connection between 




Lemma 1:  The Nonshirking Wage Rate 
  Given workers’ preferences, as represented by (1), satisfaction of (4) yields the 
nonshirking wage: 































⎥  (5) 
 
  For a given rate of return on deposits and  1 θ > , the response of the nonshirking wage to 
labor-market conditions follows standard efficiency-wage models.  If labor-market frictions, 
measured by the ratio vq , are more severe, workers have less incentive to work and firms must 
pay a higher wage to prevent shirking.  These frictions are higher when the disutility of labor 
effort ( ) is higher and/or when the technology for monitoring workers is less efficient (q 
lower).  The nonshirking wage is also higher when the alternative to work in the primary labor 
market, measured by 
v
τ , the secondary market wage, is higher.   
  Interestingly, in contrast to standard efficiency-wage models, financial-market conditions 
and the degree of risk aversion also affect the nonshirking wage.  If agents are sufficiently risk 
                                                 
16 Although the nonshirking wage provides conditions under which workers will not shirk, it does not guarantee that 
workers will choose to work instead of being unemployed (employment in the secondary sector).  Workers 
participate in the primary labor market if  ( ) ( ) 1
d





+  is satisfied.  This participation constraint 
always holds because  () 10 vq q −≥ . 
17  Campbell (1993) presents empirical evidence supporting firms’ payment of efficiency wages.  
9 averse  , a higher rate of return to deposits lowers the cost of shirking.  Those who obtain a 
job in the primary sector can self-insure against the risk of job and income loss by exerting effort 
on the job.  However, asset returns affect the desire to self-insure.  For example, when returns to 
saving are higher, agents have less need to insure against risky labor income, so firms must pay 
workers more to elicit labor effort.  Thus, the model has a novel channel or transmission 
mechanism through which monetary policy operates to have real effects, as discussed further 
below. 
( 1 θ > )
 
2.1.2  Production and the Goods Market 
  Production of the economy’s single consumption good occurs in both sectors.  In the 
secondary sector, output is simply τ .  In the primary sector, the good is produced by firms that 
have access to a technology that converts effective labor, ( ) 1 t L ψ − , into output,  , of the 
consumption good according to the function 
t Y
    () ( ) () ( )
1




=− =−  (6) 
where ψ  is the fraction of employees who exert no effort (shirk) and L is the total number of 
employees.  A is a productivity factor, which can be interpreted as incorporating the contribution 
of an exogenous and nondepreciating fixed stock of capital.
18  Satisfaction of (5) implies that 
0 ψ = .   
  The population of firms is of mass one.  Therefore, the demand for labor by a 
representative firm is the same as the market demand.  The number of workers hired comes from 
the implicit demand function for labor: 
    () () ( )
11 11 t wA L . t
η η ηψ
−− =− −  (7) 
In turn, the unemployment rate is given by  
    1 t L . t μ ≡ −  (8) 
 
2.1.3  Assets and the Banking Sector 
  There are two primary assets in this simple economy:  money (fiat currency) and a linear 
storage technology.  The real rate of return to the storage technology is constant and given by R; 
                                                 
18   See, for example, Gray (1976). 
10 in nominal terms, it is represented by  t I .  The aggregate nominal stock of money in each 
location at date t is given by  t M .  The monetary authority selects a gross inflation target of σ  
and achieves that target by allowing the money supply to grow at the fixed rate of σ ; hence, 
1 tt M M σ − = .  The price level at t is  t p , and  tt mM p t =  is the real money stock.  The initial 
money supply held by each old agent of the initial generation is  .    0 0 M >
  Two additional features of the environment give rise to trading frictions.  First, only 
currency can be transported across locations.  Second, agents cannot communicate across 
islands.  These features prevent private credit markets from operating and, along with the risk of 
relocation, give rise to a transactions demand for money in that agents demand a liquid asset that 
they can take with them when they move, even if money is dominated in rate of return.  Because 
the fraction of agents who relocate is known even though the identity of who must move is not, a 
role for banks arises to provide insurance against the risk of relocation, as in Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983).  Banks hold the economy’s assets directly, with young agents depositing all of 
their earnings, whether from work in the primary sector or home production. 
  In contrast to standard random-relocation models (e.g., Schreft and Smith 1997, 1998), 
deposits in this model vary across agents because some are employed in the primary sector while 
the others, unemployed, engage in home production.  Employed agents deposit  , and 
unemployed agents deposit  .  Agents’ employment status when young can be shown to 
be immaterial for a bank’s allocation of their deposits across assets.  Banks acquire money 









    ( ) +1 , 1 .
dd n s
tt t t t miw L L t τ +≤ − ≥ (9) 
  There is free entry into the banking sector, and banks are Nash competitors in the market 
for deposits, announcing rate of return schedules for deposits and taking the announced 
schedules of other banks as given.  Banks thus announce deposit-return schedules ( ) ,
mn
tt rr, 
where   and   are the rates of return paid to relocated agents, “movers,” and to “nonmovers,” 





    ( ) 1
dm
tt Rr ππ ≡+ −
n
t r  
11 is the rate of return on deposits.   
  Profit-maximization requires that banks maximize the expected utility of a representative 
depositor.  That is, ( ) ,
mn
tt rr is chosen to maximize  




θθ θ ππ π π
ττ
θθ θ θ
−− − −− ⎡⎤ ⎡ +− + − + ⎢⎥ ⎢ −− − − ⎣⎦ ⎣
mn s nn s m n
tt t t t t t t t Lr w r wv L L r r
1 θ − ⎤
⎥ ⎦
  (10) 
given the preferences specified in (2) for  1 θ >  and the fact that a fraction   o f  a g e n t s  i s  
employed and a fraction 1  is unemployed.  The deposit-return schedule must satisfy two 
conditions in addition to the bank’s balance sheet constraint.  First, a bank’s currency holdings 
must be sufficient to meet the demand for money by the fraction 
t L
t L −
π  of agents that must move:  
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t p
 (11) 
where  1 tt p p +  is the rate of return on real balances between t and t +1.  Second, because the 
focus in analyzing this economy is on equilibria in which money is dominated in rate of return, 
which requires   for all t, banks hold only enough currency to satisfy the withdrawal 
demand of movers, which implies that 
1 t I >
(11) is satisfied with equality and that investment in 
storage on behalf of nonmovers satisfies 













−≤ ⎜ ⎜ +− ⎝⎠
. R ⎟ ⎟  (12) 
  Since bank profit-maximization requires that (9) be satisfied at equality, constraints (11) 












≤  (13) 
and 













where  ( ( 1
dn s
ttt t t mw L L γτ ≡+ −  is the bank’s reserve-deposit ratio and 1 t γ −  is its storage 
investment-deposit ratio.  Since holdings of currency and storage must be nonnegative,  0 t γ ≥ . 
  It follows that the solution to the bank’s optimization problem is  
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When It = 1, which occurs under the Friedman rule, γ  is indeterminate because there is no 
opportunity cost of holding currency, leaving banks indifferent between currency and storage 
investments.  Hereafter, although  t γ π ≥  when It = 1,  t γ π =  is taken to be the demand for real 
balances in that case.   
 Given  () t I γ , the rate of return on deposits is 
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 With  1 θ > ,  () 0 II γ ∂∂ > , indicating that the income effect from a change in the 
nominal interest rate on the demand for real balances dominates the substitution effect.  When 
1 θ = , money demand is perfectly inelastic.  Both cases will be considered below. 
 
2.1.4  The Timing of Economic Activity 
  The features of the economy described above are consistent with the following timing of 
events each period.  At the beginning of each date, a new generation of workers is born.  The 
central bank injects currency to implement its chosen monetary policy, and the return to storage 
investments made the previous period is realized.  Old agents who did not relocate withdraw 
their deposits.  Next, firms choose the number of workers to hire and a wage rate to attract the 
desired number of workers and ensure full effort from each.  Young agents either receive job 
offers at the going wage or are involuntarily unemployed and involved in home production.  
Production occurs in the primary sector and within the homes of the unemployed, and then the 
goods market operates.  Old agents who relocated trade their currency holdings for goods, and all 
old agents then consume.  Young workers receive their earnings in the form of goods, all of 
which they deposit.  All young agents, regardless of their employment status, learn whether they 
must relocate.  Those who must move withdraw their deposits in the form of currency before 
moving.   
 
2.2  Equilibrium with  1 θ > :  A Phillips Curve Tradeoff  
13   In analyzing equilibria of this economy, attention is restricted to steady states.   
  With an inflation-targeting central bank conducting monetary policy according to the 
fixed-money-growth-rate rule specified in section 2.4, in a steady state the real rate of return on 
currency,  1 tt p p + , equals  1 σ , and IR σ = .  It follows that monetary policy affects the steady-
state rate of return on deposits, as shown in (16), in two ways.  First, a higher inflation rate 
lowers money’s rate of return, 1 σ , which directly lowers the return to deposits given the bank’s 
demand for money.  Second, higher inflation drives up the nominal interest rate.  With  1 θ > , 
agents are relatively risk averse (more so than with logarithmic preferences), so the income 
effect of a change in the nominal interest rate dominates the substitution effect.  Consequently, 
higher inflation causes banks to partially insure movers against inflation’s effects by holding 
more real balances.  Because money is dominated in rate of return, this results in a lower rate of 
return on deposits and thus a lower rate of return to nonmovers.  
 
2.2.1  Steady States 
   To obtain a closed-form solution for the steady state,  2 θ =  is assumed.  With this 
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and the nonshirking wage is  















⎟  (18) 
Substituting the expected return to deposits into (18) leads to the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 2:  The Steady-state Nonshirking Wage Rate 
  If the disutility of effort (v) is sufficiently low or the probability of detecting shirking (q) is 
sufficiently high, then the nonshirking wage rate is finite and given by  
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 (19) 
 
Proof.  For the wage rate to be positive and finite, the denominator of (19) must be positive.  
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  In this economy, the nonshirking wage is decreasing in the economy’s inflation rate.  As 
the inflation rate rises, the expected return to deposits falls, which reduces the return to labor 
effort.  To offset this loss, agents must be willing to put forth full labor effort.  The resulting 
impact on employment is provided in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  Existence of a Long-run Phillips Curve Trade-off 
  If the disutility of labor effort (v) is sufficiently low or the probability of detecting 
shirking (q) is sufficiently high, so that the nonshirking wage ( ) is positive and finite, then a 
steady state with equilibrium unemployment exists and is unique.  Steady-state employment is 
given by  
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  From Proposition 1, it follows that  ( ) 1 t L μσ σ0 ∂ ∂≡ ∂− ∂<:  the Phillips curve is 
always downward sloping. 
15  
  Because at higher inflation rates the rate of return to deposits (saving) is lower, agents 
have more incentive to work at such inflation rates and equilibrium employment is higher.  This 
is the case even though firms pay lower wages, giving workers less incentive to perform.  With 
less employment, output is lower.  This is the mechanism that generates a steady-state inflation-
unemployment tradeoff and real effects of monetary policy.   
  Two employment levels will be of particular interest in analyzing the welfare-
maximizing monetary policy.  Full employment (that is,   = 1) requires, from 
* L (20), that  
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 (21) 
At higher values of v/q and τ , the inflation target that achieves full employment is also higher.  
For π  < 0.5, as π  increases, the full-employment inflation rate is higher.  For π > 0.5, the 
opposite is the case.   
  When inflation is set to achieve the Friedman rule (that is,  1 R σ = ),  















⎟  (22) 
At the Friedman rule, agents are fully insured against liquidity risk; hence, the financial-market 
friction does not affect agents’ incentives on the job or unemployment.  However, higher v/q and 
τ  are associated with higher unemployment.   
 
2.2.2  Optimal Monetary Policy 
  Closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the optimal inflation target because welfare 
is sensitive to the parameters reflecting the labor and financial-market frictions and corner 
solutions abound.  As in standard random-relocation models, the gross nominal interest rate must 
exceed one in any equilibrium because the demand for real balances is indeterminate otherwise.  
In addition, with the possibility of unemployment, as here, and a population of young agents of 
mass 1, employment must be between zero and one in equilibrium.  Consequently, the optimal 
monetary policy is identified numerically instead.   
16   For the numerical analysis,  2 θ = ,  0.3 η = , and R = 1.02 are used, consistent with U.S. 
data or empirical estimates.  As a baseline,  0.5 π = ,  0.5 τ = , and  1.0 vq= .  The Phillips curves, 
consisting of inflation rate-unemployment rate combinations that are steady states, depend on the 
ratio v/q, not on v or q independently.  Welfare, however, measured as the expected utility of a 
representative agent, must be calculated to identify the optimal monetary policy along and across 
the Phillips curves.
19  It does depend on v through the disutility of labor effort, as indicated in (1)
.  The welfare analysis is discussed for two representative values of v:  0.001 and 0.5.  A, 
generally calculated as a residual (Abel and Bernanke, 1998), is treated as a residual here too and 
set to 1.25 so there exists an equilibrium with a reasonable unemployment rate at an inflation rate 
(target) of 2 percent (that is,  1.02 σ = ).  Because agents are either employed or unemployed in 
the model—no one is out of the labor force—the unemployment rate in the model is the 
equivalent of the measured share of the civilian population that is unemployed plus the share not 
in the labor force.  Thus, a reasonable equilibrium unemployment rate is 36 percent, given a 
labor force participation rate of about 64 percent in the data.
20      
  For these parameterizations, families of Phillips curves are graphed as functions of the 
labor-market friction parameters (τ  and v/q) and the financial-market friction parameter (π ), 
given the disutility of labor (v).  For each Phillips curve, welfare is calculated for each point 
along the curve, and the welfare-maximizing combination is identified.  Figures 1 through 6 
show the steady states and optimal monetary policies for v = 0.001, while Figures 7 through 12 
do so for v = 0.5.  As is discussed below, an equilibrium with full employment, at the Friedman 
rule, or somewhere in between, can be optimal, implying a corresponding optimal monetary 
policy.
21   
  Figure 1 displays part of the family of Phillips curves obtained by varying the opportunity 
                                                 
19   This concept of the optimal monetary policy is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s (Mishkin 2007b). 
20  The assumed values for σ , π , R, and θ  with v = 0.001 are also an equilibrium for a 5 percent unemployment 
rate, with A = 1.405.  The article’s qualitative conclusions do not change if this value of A is used in the numerical 
analysis. 
21  As discussed in footnote 15, firm profits can be positive in this version of the model.  In measuring welfare as the 
expected utility of a representative agent, meaning a two-period lived agent, the expected utility of the one-period-
lived firms is ignored.  However, higher inflation always results in higher profits and higher utility for the firms.  As 
a result, any weight put on the firms’ expected utility in determining the optimal monetary policy would reinforce 
the optimality of the full-employment equilibrium when that equilibrium maximizes the expected utility of a 
representative agent.  In contrast, when an equilibrium with a relatively low inflation rate maximizes the expected 
utility of a representative agent, such as when the Friedman rule is optimal, the welfare of firms is relatively low, 
offsetting to some extent the optimality of that equilibrium.  Therefore, considering the welfare of the firms makes 
the Friedman rule less likely to be an optimum than the analysis here indicates.   
17 cost of employment (the secondary wage rate, τ ), given a low disutility of labor.  For the 
parameters studied, steady states do not exist for τ  < 0.47 because the opportunity cost at that 
point is so low that L > 1 and μ  < 0 is required for a steady state to exist, which is not feasible.  
For  [ ] 0.47,0.502 τ ∈ , the optimal inflation rate achieves full employment.  At τ  = 0.5, for 
example, an inflation rate of 39 percent maximizes the expected utility of a representative agent.  
For  [ ] 0.503,0.507 τ ∈ , the optimal inflation rate lies between the full-employment rate and the 
Friedman Rule.  For  [ ] 0.508,0.98 τ ∈ , the Friedman rule is optimal, with the highest 
unemployment rate achievable.  When τ  is in that range, unemployment is a relatively desirable 
state for many agents.  For  0.98 τ > , the alternative to working in the primary sector is so 
lucrative that unemployment is too desirable—the unemployment rate that solves the model is 
negative, which is not feasible—so no steady state exists.   
  With the optimal inflation rate so dependent on the opportunity cost of employment, a 
natural question to ask is how expected utility compares across Phillips curves.  Figure 2 graphs 
expected utility under the optimal monetary policy for each Phillips curve in Figure 1 (for each 
τ ).  Expected utility is highly nonlinear in τ , depending on the fraction of agents working 
versus not working and the marginal utility from employment versus unemployment, and each 
component moves in opposite directions.  Hence, expected utility under the optimal monetary 
policy is convex, with  0.98 τ =  maximizing welfare across values of τ , as shown in Figure 2.   
  What values of the opportunity cost of employment are most likely to be observed?  τ  
can be thought of as the value of home production (for example, the cost that a worker not 
employed in the primary market saves by doing housekeeping rather than paying a housekeeper 
and perhaps of caring for children rather than paying a nanny), the income earned at a minimum-
wage job, or unemployment compensation.  This suggests that lower values of τ  are more likely 
to be observed than higher ones, which in turn suggests that the full-employment monetary 
policy is more likely to be the optimal monetary policy than the Friedman rule.   
  Figure 3 shows the family of Phillips curves that arises as labor-market frictions 
associated with the disutility of labor and the effectiveness of firm monitoring of worker effort, 
represented by the ratio v/q, vary.  For v/q < 0.85, no steady state exists with a nonnegative 
unemployment rate.  For  [ ] 0.85,1.05 ∈ vq , full- or near-full employment is optimal.  For 
18 [ ] 1.06,1.145 ∈ vq , the optimal steady state has less than full employment and inflation higher 
than the Friedman rule.  As v/q increases beyond 1.145, the Friedman Rule is always optimal.    
  Not surprisingly, welfare is higher when the labor-market frictions represented by v/q are 
lower, as Figure 4 shows.  Agents prefer full employment and the low inflation rate available 
when v/q = 0.85, which also allows the nominal interest rate to be fairly low, limiting the welfare 
cost of having to relocate, over all other steady states, even the one where the Friedman rule is 
followed and financial frictions are neutralized.   
  It is tempting to conclude that better firm monitoring, which lowers v/q given v, is 
desirable.  However, in reality, v rises when q rises:  more intense and accurate firm monitoring 
lowers job satisfaction, which equates to greater disutility of labor.  See, for example, 
Ottensmeyer and Heroux (1991) and Wood (1998). 
  Figures 5 and 6 display the last set of numerical results for this economy with v = 0.001.  
Figure 5 shows how the Phillips curves vary with the financial-market friction, π .  For  0.5 π ≥ , 
the full-employment steady state is optimal.  The higher π  is in that range, the lower the 
inflation rate associated with that equilibrium.  For π  < 0.5, the unemployment rate rises at the 
welfare-maximizing steady state.  Initially, the inflation rate also rises, but eventually it declines 
with reductions in π .  As π  approaches zero, the optimal monetary policy approaches the 
Friedman rule.
22   
  Figure 6 displays expected utility under the optimal monetary policy as π  varies.  
Welfare is maximized at  1.0 π = , meaning that all agents must relocate at the end of their youth.  
Welfare is minimized as  0.0 π → , where no agents relocate.  Interestingly, the steady state 
achieved when  1.0 π =  is much like that as  0.0 π ≈  in that there is virtually no uncertainty about 
relocation, or equivalently, there are no liquidity shocks.  Banks’ portfolios are very different 
across the two steady states, however.  When  1.0 π = , banks hold all their assets in the form of 
currency, whereas at  0.0 π ≈ , hardly anyone relocates, so banks invest almost all of their assets 
in storage.  In the latter case, the inflation rate has almost no effect on the rate of return on 
deposits.  The welfare gain from achieving the Friedman rule when  0.0 π ≈  is insufficient to 
offset the welfare cost of the high unemployment rate that must obtain for the Friedman rule to 
be the steady-state inflation rate. 
                                                 
22  At π = 0, the wage rate is undefined.   
19   Figures 7 through 12 show the steady states and optimal monetary policies when the 
disutility of labor effort is relatively high (that is, at v = 0.5).  The Phillips curves shown in 
Figures 1, 3, and 5 are identical to those in Figures 7, 9, and 11, respectively:  v independent of q 
does not affect the inflation-unemployment relationship.  Only expected utility differs at the 
higher value of v, and differs sufficiently that the Friedman rule is the optimal policy along each 
Phillips curve in Figures 7, 9, and 11, and a central bank should put full weight on its inflation 
objective.  Intuitively, as the inflation rate rises, the unemployment rate falls, so employment is 
higher.  With a higher v, the disutility from labor effort of the representative agent is lower, even 
though the utility from consumption is not altered.  As a result, welfare is lower at higher 
inflation rates for higher v than for lower v, other things equal.   
  Figures 8, 10, and 12 show expected utility under the optimal monetary policy across the 
Phillips curves in Figures 7, 9, and 11, respectively.  The values of τ  and v/q that maximize 
expected utility are the same regardless of the value of v, as seen by comparing Figure 8 to 
Figure 2 and Figure 10 to Figure 4.  That is not the case for π , however.  Expected utility is 
highest when π  = 1.0 when the disutility of labor effort is low (v = 0.001, Figure 6) but is 
independent of π  when the disutility of labor effort is high (v = 0.5, Figure 12).  When work is 
sufficiently unpleasant that the welfare-maximizing steady state is always at the Friedman rule, 
as is the case in Figure 11, the gross nominal interest rate is 1.0, which neutralizes the impact of 
the financial-market friction, π , whatever its value.  Hence, welfare is the same at the Friedman 
rule regardless of the value of π .   
  It is not clear what values are reasonable for the disutility from labor effort.  The true 
value could vary by job (e.g., v might be lower for empowered workers in pleasant work 
environments), based on national culture (e.g., differences between American workers and their 
European counterparts), or over time for a variety of reasons (e.g., a worker’s age, trends in 
employer-provided benefits).  There seems little way for a central bank to know the true value of 
v, yet the value matters if a central bank is to adopt the optimal inflation target.  A central bank 
that knows τ , v/q, and π  still might not know v and therefore would not know how to conduct 
monetary policy to maximize welfare. 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
  The numerical analysis of the optimal policy is striking because of the extent to which 
20 labor-market and financial-market frictions affect the optimal inflation target.  The optimal 
monetary policy can be the inflation target that achieves full employment or the Friedman rule or 
some target in between.  The greater the disutility of labor, the more likely it is that the Friedman 
rule is optimal.   
  One implication of these results is that an inflation target chosen without good estimates 
of the magnitude of the frictions, the opportunity cost of employment, or the disutility from labor 
could achieve a steady state far from the one that maximizes welfare, contrary to a central bank’s 
intentions.  In addition, the weight that a central bank with a dual mandate puts on inflation 
versus unemployment depends on the labor-market and financial-market frictions present.  When 
the optimal policy is to achieve full employment, the central bank should emphasize its 
employment goal, but when the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy, all weight should 
be put on price stability.  When optimal monetary policy involves an inflation target somewhere 
between the full-employment rate and the Friedman rule, the central bank must balance its dual 
goals.   
 
2.3  Equilibrium with  1 θ = :  A Vertical Phillips Curve  
 When  1 θ = , γ π =  from (15):  money demand is perfectly inelastic, so the income and 
substitution effects of a change in the nominal interest rate offset each other.  In addition, the 
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This implies that agents’ incentives in the labor market do not depend on financial returns.  The 
same is true for the Phillips curve, which is vertical at a “natural” rate of unemployment that 
depends only on real factors:   



















  With a vertical Phillips curve, the Friedman rule is always optimal, and a central bank 
should focus only on its price-stability goal, as the following proposition shows. 
 
Proposition 2:   Optimality of the Friedman Rule When  1 θ = . 
21  When  1 θ = , welfare is maximized when  1/R σ = . 
 
Proof.   With  1 θ = , 
* γ π = , 
* 1
m r σ = , and 
* n rR = .  Expected utility of the representative agent 
is  
   () ( )() ( ) () ( )
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mn Lw L r r v L
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The first bracketed term is independent of the money growth rate.  The second bracketed term is 
() ( ) ( ln 1 1 ln R πσ π +− ) , which is maximized when the central bank sets  1/R σ = , which drives 
I to one. 
 
3.  A Model of the Phillips Curve with Capital Accumulation 
  This section extends the analysis of Section 2 to a neoclassical growth framework in 
which physical capital replaces storage as the economy’s real asset.  As in standard monetary 
models such as Stockman (1981), the economy exhibits a reverse Tobin effect.  However, 
anticipated inflation also has an impact on investment through the labor-market effects of 
unemployment. 
 
3.1  The Environment 
  The environment is the same as in Section 2, except that in the primary sector firms have 
access to a constant-returns technology that combines capital,  , with effective labor,  t K
( ) 1 t L ψ − , to produce output: 
   ( ) ( ) ,1 . tt YF K L ψ =− t  
For simplicity, capital completely depreciates at the end of the period.  If  () () 1 tt t kK L ψ ≡−  
denotes the capital-primary-sector labor ratio (hereafter, the “capital-labor ratio”), then  
    (26)  () () ( ) ,0 , 0 , tt fk A k A
η η ≡> ∈ 1 .
  In addition to choosing wages and employment to maximize profits, as described 
previously, firms also choose the amount of capital to rent.  The rental decision implies that the 
gross real return to capital satisfies 
  ( )
1,
η η
− ′ == tt t Rf k A k (27) 
22 and the demand for labor is given by 
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  In all other respects, the economy is as in Section 2. 
 
3.2 Equilibrium  with  1 θ > :  An Upward-sloping Phillips Curve 




− =  (29) 








η η − ⎛⎞ =⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (30) 
As a result, the wage rate as a function of the rental rate on capital is 
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. (31) 
Higher rental rates result in less capital being used per worker and thus a lower marginal product 
of labor in the primary sector and a lower wage rate. 
  From the analysis in Section 2, the nonshirking wage is  
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 (32) 
  In a steady-state equilibrium for this economy, R
* is the unique value of R that equates 
(31) and (32), and from (30), pins down the steady-state capital-labor ratio,  . 
* k
  As in Section 2, the bank’s balance-sheet constraint must hold with equality.  In turn, this 
implies that steady-state investment satisfies 
   ( ) ( ) ( )
** * * 11 γτ =− + − iw L
* L  (33) 
and that the demand for real balances satisfies  
23 ( ) ( )
** * * * 1. mw L L γτ =+ −  
Total investment,  , is equal to the capital stock,  , in the steady state: 
* i
* K
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** * * ** * * 11 KL k R w L L γτ == −+ − .  (34) 
Given the economy’s steady-state capital-labor ratio,  ( )
** kR, steady-state employment is: 
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  From the foregoing, the effect of capital accumulation on the economy can be analyzed.  
As in Section 2, monetary policy affects performance incentives.  At higher inflation rates, 
workers bear a higher cost of shirking, so wages are lower and employment is higher.  However, 
at higher inflation rates, the nominal interest rate is higher, and with  1 θ > , banks hold more 
currency and invest less in capital formation.  This is a reverse-Tobin effect.  Since capital and 
labor are complements, less capital accumulation is accompanied by less employment and a 
higher unemployment rate.  The net impact on employment depends on which effect dominates.  
Although closed-form solutions cannot be obtained, it is expected that the second effect 
dominates when  1 θ > , resulting in Phillips curves that are upward sloping.  
  Figures 13 through 18 present the results from numerical analysis of this economy, 
assuming  2 θ =  and η = 0.335, the latter approximately the same as its value in the analysis of 
Section 2.  As a baseline,  0.5 π = ,  0.5 τ = , and  1.0 vq=  are again used.  Although steady states 
only depend on the ratio of v to q, and expected utility also depends on v independent of q, the 
analysis is only presented for v = 0.001, for reasons presented below.  R is now endogenous.  The 
analysis is extremely sensitive to changes in A, which is set at 0.725.   
  Figures 13, 15, and 17 show the Phillips curve families as τ , v/q, and π , respectively, 
are varied.  All Phillips curves are upward-sloping, with the slope increasing at an increasing rate 
as the unemployment rate rises.  The curves shift to the right as the opportunity cost of work and 
the friction parameters increase.   
  The analysis of the optimal monetary policy is the same qualitatively whether the impact 
of τ , v/q, or π  is studied because of the model’s corner solutions and the slope of the Phillips 
curves.  In each case, for sufficiently small values of each parameter, given the baseline values of 
the others, the Friedman rule cannot be implemented in a steady state because it would require 
24 the unemployment rate to be negative.  Welfare maximization instead requires a central bank to 
set its inflation target to the lowest inflation rate for which a steady state exists (Figures 13, 15, 
and 17).  This achieves the lowest equilibrium unemployment rate.  Consequently, the qualitative 
results regarding the optimal monetary policy do not depend qualitatively on whether the 
disutility of labor (v) is low or high, so only the results for v = 0.001 are presented. 
  The critical values for the parameters are 0.2 for τ , 1.0 for v/q, and 0.5 for π  (Figures 
14, 16, and 18, respectively).  The Friedman rule is optimal for values at and above the critical 
values (Figures 13, 15, and 17, respectively), at which point I = 1.0 and the impact of the 
financial-market friction is neutralized.
23  However, unemployment continues to increase in τ , 
v/q, and π  for values above the critical levels.  Intuitively, any steady state in which the 
Friedman rule is implemented equates the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution across 
movers and nonmovers, who are ex ante identical.  However, the Friedman rule does not 
eliminate the existence of the financial-market friction; a fraction π  of the population still must 
relocate after they finish working, and agents’ awareness of this, but not of which individuals 
must relocate, affects their incentives to work.  Agents know that banks will hold more currency 
and invest less in capital formation the higher is π .  Because labor and capital are complements, 
less capital formation implies that fewer agents will be employed in equilibrium and that less 
output will be available to consume when old.  Thus, even though agents’ intertemporal marginal 
rates of substitution are equated in all equilibria in which the Friedman rule is achieved, 
unemployment is higher and welfare lower when either τ , v/q, or π  is higher, given baseline 
values of the others.  Only at the critical levels of τ , v/q, and π  are financial-market frictions 
neutralized and income risk minimized.   
  For all values of τ , v/q, and π  studied, a central bank with a dual mandate should focus 
only on achieving its inflation goal.  “Price stability” should be defined as the lowest inflation 
rate consistent with the existence of a steady-state equilibrium.  That might not be consistent 
with the Friedman rule, but it achieves the lowest equilibrium unemployment rate.   
 
3.3 Equilibrium  with  1 θ = :  A Vertical Phillips Curve  
  As in the economy without capital, when  1 θ = , the demand for real balances is perfectly 
                                                 
23  In the analysis of Section 2, with a fixed capital stock, the Friedman rule requires setting σ  = 1/R to achieve I = 
1.0.  With capital formation, a central bank must set σ  > 1/R to achieve I = 1.0 if I = 1.0 is a steady state 
equilibrium. 
25 inelastic and equal to π , independent of the rates of return on any assets.  Consequently, the 
nonshirking wage rate only depends on the severity of labor-market frictions: 
   ,
v
ns q we τ =  (36) 
and the wage condition is 
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Because   in a steady state, the steady-state real return to capital is  ()
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  As in the economy without capital formation, the Phillips curve is vertical at the natural 
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 (40)   
This natural rate of unemployment is higher if labor-market frictions are more severe (q lower, v 
and τ  higher).  However, in contrast to the natural rate for the Section 2 economy, depicted in 
(24), this natural rate also depends on the intensity of the financial-market friction.  The higher 
the probability of relocation, the higher the natural rate of unemployment.  With a greater 
fraction of depositors having to move, banks must hold more real balances and invest less in 
capital formation, which implies less employment in equilibrium.   
  The following proposition may now be stated: 
26  
Proposition 3.   Optimality of the Friedman Rule When  1 θ = . 
  When  1 θ =  and capital formation is possible, welfare is maximized when  1/R σ = . 
 
Proof.   The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, but 
* n rR
* =  from (38). 
 
  It follows that a central bank with a dual mandate should put all its weight on its inflation 
objective. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This article has shown that an upward-sloping, downward-sloping, or vertical long-run 
Phillips curve can arise in an overlapping-generations monetary model with random relocation 
and involuntary unemployment.  The slope of the Phillips curve and optimal monetary policy 
depend on fundamentals of labor and financial markets, on agents’ degree of risk aversion, and 
on whether capital formation is possible.  They are independent of any wage or price stickiness 
and unanticipated inflation.   
Although the model studied in this article is rich in many respects, it is abstract in others.  
For example, because only steady states are derived, the article is silent on the short-run 
dynamics of the inflation-unemployment relationship.  Mankiw (2001) has noted that the 
dynamic relationship between inflation and unemployment also has not been explained by the 
New Keynesian models of the Phillips curve, which are not consistent with the delayed and 
gradual effect that monetary policy has on inflation.  This article does not resolve that mystery.  
Doing so must be the subject of future research.   
The model also abstracts from asset accumulation and from adverse selection.  Agents 
who have worked previously and already accumulated some assets presumably would be more 
likely to shirk if they went back to work, affecting the wage rate firms would have to offer to 
induce such agents to take employment in the primary sector.  Agents also could differ in their 
ability to perform on the job, and their abilities might be private information.  Firms might offer 
higher wages to attract at least some better workers into the labor market.  Monetary policy, 
through its effects on asset returns, would reinforce or mitigate the impacts of asset 
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31 Figure 1 
Phillips Curves for Economy with Fixed Capital Stock as the Opportunity Cost of 























τ  = 0.47:  Optimal inflation rate is 5% and achieves full employment, not the Friedman rule.  For τ 
between 0.47 and 0.502, the full-employment inflation rate is also optimal.  For τ < 0.47, no steady 
states exist.   
τ  =  0.55:  Friedman rule is 
optimal
τ  = 0.6: 
Friedman rule is 
optimal
Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
τ = 0.98: Friedman rule 
is optimal.  For τ > 0.98, 
no steady state exists at 
the Friedman rule.
τ  =  0.507:  Optimal inflation rate is 18% with 26.3% unemployment.  
For τ > 0.507, the Friedman Rule is optimal.
 
 
32 Figure 2 
Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Fixed Capital Stock
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001
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v/q = 1.0:  Optimal inflation rate is 38.8% with 0.08% unemployment.
v/q = 0.85:  Optimal inflation rate is 0.3%, not the Friedman 
rule, with full employment.  No steady states exist for lower 
v/q.
v/q = 1.2:  Friedman rule is 
optimal.
v/q = 1.1:  Optimal inflation rate is 64.5% with 5.1% unemployment. 
v/q = 1.14:  Optimal inflation rate is 66% with 10.3% unemployment.  For v/q > 
1.145, the Friedman rule is optimal.
Assumes:  η  = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v = 0.001; τ = 0.5.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
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Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Fixed Capital Stock
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  τ = 0.5; v = 0.001
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π   = 0.5:  Optimal inflation rate is 38.5%, consistent with full employment.  
As π  rises further, the optimal inflation rate falls as the Phillips curve flattens, 
but remains the rate that achieves full employment.
π   = 0.3:  Optimal inflation rate is 44% with 14.2% unemployment.
π   = 0.4:  Optimal inflation rate is 50% with 0.9% unemployment
π   = 0.2:  Optimal inflation rate is 33% with 26.9% unemployment.
π   = 0.1:  Optimal inflation rate is 23% with 35.3% unemployment.  
As π  falls toward zero, the optimal inflation rate converges to the Friedman Rule, and the 
unemployment rate rises toward 40.1%.
Assumes:  η = 0.3;  R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001; τ = 0.5.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
π = 1.0:  Optimal inflation rate is 16.5% with 0.36% unemployment.  
 
 
36 Figure 6 
Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Fixed Capital Stock
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Assumes:  η  = 0.3;  R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001; τ = 0.5
 
 
37 Figure 7 
Phillips Curves for Economy with Fixed Capital Stock as the Opportunity Cost of 













τ  = 0.47:  No steady states exist for lower τ.   Friedman rule is optimal for τ 
between 0.47 and 0.98.  For higher τ, no steady state exists at the Friedman 
rule.
τ  =  0.55
τ = 0.6
Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.5.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
τ = 0.98
τ  =  0..507
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Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Fixed Capital Stock
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.5
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v/q = 0.85: No steady states exist for lower v/q. Friedman 
rule is optimal for v/q between 0.85 and 1.96.  For higher v/q, 




Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  τ = 0.5; v = 0.5.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
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Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Fixed Capital Stock
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Assumes:  η  = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  τ = 0.5; v = 0.5
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π   = 0.5
π   = 0.3
π   = 0.4
π   = 0.2
π   = 0.1
Assumes:  η  = 0.3;  R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.5; τ = 0.5.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
π = 1.0
Friedman rule is always optimal.
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Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Fixed Capital Stock
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.5; τ = 0.5.
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Phillips Curve for Economy with Capital Formation as the Opportunity Cost 
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τ = 0.1:  Optimal inflation rate is 1461%, with 0.01% unemployment.  
For τ ≥ 0.2, the Friedman rule is optimal.  For lower τ, it is not.
τ = 0.3:  Optimal 
inflation rate is 116.5% 
with 57.7% 
unemployment
τ = 0.2: Optimal inflation 
rate is 8% with 9.6% 
unemployment
τ  = 0.15:  Optimal inflation rate is 339.5%, with 
full employment




τ  = 0.175: Optimal inflation rate is 106.5% 
with full employment
τ = 0.225:  Optimal 




44 Figure 14 
Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Capital Formation
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  π = 0.5; R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001
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v/q = 0.5:  Optimal inflation rate is 85.9%, with 0.007% 
unemployment.  For v/q ≥ 1, the Friedman rule is optimal. For 
lower v/q, it is not.
v/q = 1:  Optimal inflation rate is 
1%, with 1.8% unemployment
v/q = 2:  Optimal 
inflation rate is 32%, 
with 31.4% 
unemployment
v/q = 1.78:  Optimal 
inflation rate is 25%, with 
26.2% unemployment
v/q = 1.14:  Optimal 
inflation rate is 6%, with 
7.2% unemployment
v/q = 0.94:  Optimal inflation rate is 3.4%, 
with 0.007% unemployment
v/q = 1.07:  Optimal inflation rate is 3%, 
with 4.4% unemployment
v/q = 1.25:  Optimal inflation rate 
is 9%, with 10.9% unemployment
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Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Capital Formation
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001; τ = 0.5.  Optimal inflation rate denoted by ♦.
π = 0.98:  
Optimal 
inflation rate is 
1% with 96.8% 
unemployment  
π = 0.7:  Optimal 
inflation rate 1% with 
46% unemployment 
π = 0.1: Optimal inflation rate is 13643.8% 
with full unemployment.  Friedman rule is 
optimal for π  ≥ 0.5.
π = 0.3:  Optimal inflation rate 
is 766.4% with full 
unemployment
π = 0.5:  Optimal inflation
 rate is 1% with 1.84%
 unemployment
π = 0.6:  Optimal 
inflation rate is 1% 
with 25% 
unemployment
π = 0.4:  Optimal inflation
rate is 213% with full
unemployment
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Expected Utility under the Optimal Monetary Policy
in an Economy with Capital Formation
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Assumes:  η = 0.3;  R = 1.02; A = 1.25;  v/q = 1.0; v = 0.001; τ = 0.5.
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